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I thank Peter Harrison for his courteous response. 
Overall, it advances the discussion of pain and its 
moral significance. Unfortunately for Harrison, 
however, his reply succeeds no better than his 
original article in justifying his denial of nonhuman 
suffering. Space limitations prevent me from 
responding in full to him, so I will focus on the key 
elements in his reply. I fully agree with his 
suggestion that interested readers should draw their 
own conclusions by reading his original, unexcerpted 
paper as well as our exchange. 
Harrison's position 
and what he must do to support it  
Let us first be as clear as we can about what 
Harrison actually claims. We must not forget that 
theodicy is his driving motive. Harrison believes that 
it is easy to reconcile human pain with the existence 
ofa perfect God: it is the price of free will and builds 
character. Nonhuman suffering, he assumes, cannot 
be explained in this way. Rejecting as "ad hoc" the 
theodicy proposing that fallen angels rather than God 
are responsible for natural evils, including animal 
suffering, l Harrison embraces a version of Descartes' 
theodicy. According to that view, nonhuman animals 
are said to lack awareness of anything, including 
stimuli we find to be painful; thus, no experiences of 
theirs can be used as ammunition for the problem of 
evil. They are mindless bodies; humans are minds 
linked to bodies in this life. While accepting 
Descartes' conclusion, Harrison partially rejects the 
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dualistic interactionism underpinning that con-
clusion. Apparently agreeing with Descartes' early 
critics that a nonphysical substance (mind) and a 
physical substance (body) could not directly affect 
each other, he amends the Cartesian position, as 
Malebranche did, by proposing the theory of 
"occasionalism": 
To work properly it [the Cartesian position] 
must assume God's activity in human beings, 
correlating bodily events (the flame burns my 
hand) with mental states (I feel pain). This 
'occasionalism' is admittedly also ad hoc and 
mythological, but less so than attributing 
earthquakes, floods, volcanoes, disease and 
animal pain to demonic activity.2 
In short, on this view the flame which burns the 
hand, leading to nerve impulses that eventually reach 
the cortex, is not the cause of the pain: God sees to 
it that this "nonphysical" experience results. 3 
Nonhuman animals are exempt from all such 
supernatural promptings.4 
Of course, the burden is on Harrison to make a 
case for his position, not on his critics to show his 
view to be false. Merely saying that his version of 
Descartes' view is a better solution to the problem 
of evil than the invocation of demons would hardly 
carry the day, as Harrison is well aware. A number 
of additional arguments are needed if he is to 
demonstrate the plausibility of his view. These 
arguments must appeal to premises that are them-
selves plausible. If there is significant evidence 
against those premises, Harrison should at least 
acknowledge that evidence. He assuredly should not 
appeal to premises that presuppose, in whole or in 
part, that his position is true, without attempting to 
support those premises or referring us to other authors 
who supply such support. Finally, since Harrison's 
denial of nonhuman animal pain seems to fly in the 
face of the evidence, he should endeavor to provide 
us with plausible ways of interpreting nonhuman 
animal behavior. If his hypothesis cannot do at least 
as good a job as the consciousness hypothesis in 
accounting for nonhuman animal behavior, it should 
be rejected. In his reply to me, Harrison has attempted 
to support some previously unsupported contentions 
in his original paper, but, as I shall argue, he has still 
not shown his position to be plausible. 
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Mind-body theories 
and the charge of linguistic confusion 
Harrison's discussion of alternative mind-body 
theories is welcome. He correctly says that dualists 
believe that a proposition about mental states is 
different in meaning and reference (connotation and 
denotation) from a proposition about physical states. 
I would add that a plausible monistic theory such as 
materialism will hold that propositions about mental 
states differ in meaning but not reference from certain, 
perhaps still undiscovered propositions about physical 
states. (We would hardly have been arguing about 
mind-body theories for millennia if meaning or 
linguistic usage settled the question.) It is also the case 
that the argument from analogy to other minds, human 
or nonhuman, is compatible with both dualism and 
materialism. According to it, certain behavior 
(including possible utterances like "I am in excru-
ciating pain at this moment," screaming, writhing, 
etc.5), at certain times, in beings physiologically 
similar to oneself in relevant ways empirically 
warrants the conclusion that these others are also 
conscious, however consciousness may be meta-
physically construed. In principle, the inference to 
nonhuman animal sentience is drawn in the same way 
as one's inference that other humans, be they verbal 
or pre-verbal, are conscious. 
Harrison claims otherwise, saying in his reply that 
we can "never" know what a nonhuman animal's 
mental states (if any) are, since "their nervous 
systems differ from ours in significant ways" and "we 
have no independent access to their mental states." 
On the first count, however, as Harrison has conceded 
with regard to pain, many nonhuman animals share 
with humans all the relevantly similar neurological 
structures and processes. On the second count, what 
does Harrison mean by saying that we have no 
"independent access" to any nonhuman animal 
mental states? Barring telepathy, it would seem that 
we also lack such access to the mental states of other 
humans: we must infer such states from their behavior 
and the empirical circumstances. For Harrison's 
claim to make sense, he must be assuming that verbal 
reporting-language-is required for knowledge of 
another's mental states. Indeed, he refers to "the 
language criterion of consciousness" in his note 12, 
and appears to be presupposing it in his discussion 
of the concept of dreaming. But why must one 
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assume that language is required as evidence of 
consciousness, given the well-known problems with 
that view? Even Peter Carruthers has avoided that 
pitfall. Harrison refers to Wittgensteinian philosopher 
Norman Malcolm to support his view, but this is of 
little help. According to Malcolm, verbal reports are 
the "criterion" (in his words, "something that settles 
a question with certainty") of dreaming. In general, 
Malcohn holds that claims about mental states must 
have publicly observable "criteria" to constitute 
their verification; otherwise, such claims are 
"nonsense."6 Nonhuman animals do not report 
dreams, although they go through all the brain 
activity and twitching, etc., that humans do before 
waking and reporting dreams. This leads Malcolm 
to remark offhandedly that "a dog's dream" has "no 
content.,,7 Harrison then generalizes, claiming that 
any "meaningful" attribution of mental states to 
nonhuman animals cannot mean what we mean 
when we attribute such states to other humans: such 
terms must refer to purely physical characteristics, 
since we have no other criteria for their correct 
application. Any talk, then, of "grief," "anxiety," 
"pain," and "choice" pertaining to nonhumans is 
properly talk about nonmental states. Anyone 
thinking otherwise, Harrison concludes, is guilty of 
"linguistic confusion." 
This argument does not add to the plausibility of 
Harrison's position. It relies entirely upon Malcolm's 
version of the philosophically misbegotten and long 
since refuted verifiability criterion ofmeaningfulness. 
The behavioral sciences have clung to this view long 
after its philosophical demise, as Bernard Rollin has 
documented, but for some time now they have been 
emerging from its spell. Thus, Harrison has not shown 
at all that, e.g., ethological research indicating that 
nonhuman animals are capable of making some 
choices (not "choices"),8 as well as other such 
research, is based on "linguistic confusion." Moreover, 
even apart from the familiar fatal flaws of the 
verifiability criterion, its use in the context of 
Harrison's attack on the argument from analogy is 
highly questionable. Harrison simply assumes without 
further ado that the behavioral and physiological 
similarities between humans and many nonhumans is 
not good evidence for consciousness in the latter. This 
is tantamount to assuming, without supporting 
argumentation, that the argument from analogy is bad: 
once again, the question is begged.9 
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On the alleged disproportion 
between physical and mental worlds 
In order to further support his denial of nonhuman 
animal consciousness, Harrison claims that there is "no 
proportionality betw~en physical and mental worlds." 
He notes that even our closest physical relatives, 
chimpanzees, who are 98.4% genetically similar to us 
and whose brains are so like ours, have not begun to 
equal human accomplishments: "There is in the animal 
world nothing to compare with the products of the 
conscious mind." He dismisses chimpanzees' ability 
to carry on simple conversations in sign language: after 
all, he observes, these communications would never be 
confused with Shakespeare's creations! 
Does the fact that nonhuman animals have not 
created art works "98.4%" as good as our own show 
that there is no correlation between brain development 
and mental states, as Harrison would have it? Hardly! 
He neglects to consider that modem human brains are 
340% larger than chimpanzee brains (chimpanzee and 
human body sizes are comparable). The chimpanzee 
brain is almost as large as the brain ofAustralopithecus, 
the frrst hominid genus (as far as we knoW).lO One 
cannot expect Hamlet from a human-sized being with 
a 400 g brain (the vast majority of those of us with 
1350 g brains could never manage it either).l1 We know 
ofno Australopithecine Bards either (if there were any, 
they failed to record their soliloquies); it does not follow 
from this that they were not conscious. In fact, there is 
good evidence that these ancient forebears used stone 
too1S.12 Not coincidentally, chimpanzees, who according 
to genetic evidence have been diverging from hominids 
for about 5 million years, also are known to fashion 
and use tools. Contrary to Harrison, the correlation 
between relative brain size/structure and evidence of 
intelligence is just what one would expect. 
Other mental states also have their physical 
correlates, including pain. PET scans of humans have 
revealed three different areas of the brain that are 
operative during painful experiences.13 Much research 
now indicates that higher and lower thresholds of pain 
are related to specific neural structures and activity.14 
Moreover, autopsies ofdisease- and drug-free bumans 
who had killed themselves after suffering from chronic 
pain and depression indicate that they had abnormal 
levels ofcertain brain chemicals as well as abnormalities 
in their opiate receptors. Researchers doing this latter 
study note that nonhuman animal experiments in which 
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the subjects were exposed to high levels of stress and 
pain-producing stimuli (not just to "stress" and "pain") 
indicated that the same abnormalities were present.15 
Contrary to Harrison, we do not find a wild dispro-
portion between physical states and mental states: quite 
the opposite. All of these findings, of course, are 
compatible with dualistic as well as materialistic 
theories of mind and body, and they are thoroughly in 
tune with evolutionary theory. 
Harrison, however, believes that relating evolu-
tionary theory to the emergence and development of 
mental states is utterly unwarranted, because "it is 
behaviours, not mental states, which adapt, and it is 
only physical entities which can be the subjects of 
natural selection." This would come as quite a surprise 
to all the evolutionary biologists (Allan Wilson and 
Stephen Gould among them) who link natural selection 
to the development of intelligence, among many other 
mental traits. Harrison's claim, of course, presupposes 
that materialism must be false; anyone not already 
convinced of this will hardly be impressed. But, most 
importantly, even many dualists would find his claim 
to be highly misleading at best. However mind or mental 
states may be "connected" to the body, dualists hold 
that mental and physical states form some sort of unit 
during earthly life. What happens to the body is not 
unrelated to the mind or one's mental states. 
Interactionists have no problem with evolutionary 
processes being correlated with mental changes; nor 
do epiphenomenalists or double-aspect theorists. Even 
parallelists could have no objection to increased 
mental complexity accompanying increased nervous 
system complexity; "hypophenomenalists" such as 
Schopenhauer, who believe that the mind drives the 
development of the physical world, would positively 
embrace the notion.16 Only followers of one form of 
dualism could unequivocally accept Harrison's claim 
that mental states do not change in conjunction with 
the physical processes of evolution: occasionaIists. If 
God is called upon to see to it that the appropriate mental 
states, whatever those are, occur in humans on particular 
occasions, we can see why there need be no mental 
parallel to the physical world. God is free to fasbion 
any miracle that God chooses to fasbion. Clearly, 
Harrison, an occasionalist, cannot use this argument to 
buttress his own position! The overwhelming evidence 
of correlations between "the mental and physical 
worlds" gives us independent grounds for rejecting 
Harrison's claims. 
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Inadequate models of complex nonhuman animal 
behavior 
If nonhuman animals are indeed not conscious, 
how are we to comprehend what they do? In his 
original paper, Harrison gives us two explanations of 
seemingly purposeful behavior by nonhumans; each, 
he thinks, shows the assumption of consciousness to 
be superfluous. (1) We know from our own cases that 
reflexes allow us to pull back from a flame before the 
pain is felt. Thus, the experience ofpain is not required 
for the appropriate survival-enhancing behavior to 
occur (remember, humans get the experience anyway 
because it builds character). Harrison immediately 
cautions us that he is not claiming that all animal 
behavior in circumstances we would find painful is of 
this type,17 so we clearly need some further models. 
Moreover, the reflex proposal is not even plausible if 
we take it in the limited way intended, since it gives 
us no way to understand avoidance behavior after a 
single exposure to the damaging stimulus. (2) To show 
that nonhuman animal learning ("learning?") need not 
in principle involve consciousness, Harrison cites the 
example of protozoan habituation. Again, as I noted 
in my paper, he claims not to be saying that all 
nonhuman animal learning is of this kind!8-a wise 
claim, given that very little behavior by complex 
nonhumans would fit this model. However, one waits 
in vain for more plausible models.!9 
In his response, Harrison suggests that socio-
biological explanations making no reference to mental 
states can in principle account for all complex 
nonhuman animal behavior. He takes what he claims 
to be an example of mine: a nonhuman's refusal to eat 
after the death of a companion. The surviving member 
of a "superannuated breeding pair," he proposes, is 
now past breeding; fasting would free resources for 
use by younger conspecifics. Genes, then, would be 
sufficient to explain "grieving" behavior. This 
proposal, of course, cannot account for similar 
behavior by younger nonhumans at the death of 
companions who are not even members of their own 
species. Harrison guards against such criticisms by 
saying that it really does not matter if his particular 
account here works out: the important thing is that 
some such account is always possible. Nonetheless, 
the fact remains that we have still not been given a 
single plausible nonmentalistic account of complex 
nonhuman animal behavior.2o I cannot help adding that 
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I find it a bit odd that an occasionalist, for whom each 
human mental state is a miracle wrought by God, 
rejects the hypothesis that nonhuman animals are 
conscious on the grounds that it is "superfluous." 
Surely, Occam's Razor cuts both ways. 
Drawing some ethical conclusions 
I conclude my response to Harrison by taking up 
the issue with which he began his reply to me: the 
ethical implications, if any, of his denial of nonhuman 
animal consciousness. Harrison, of course, cautions 
us at the end ofhis original article that he is not urging 
us to beat "our infants and pets."2! He apparently 
follows Aquinas and Kant in holding that such 
treatment might encourage the mistreatment of 
humans. I will not here repeat the familiar criticisms 
of such reasoning.22 Contrary to Harrison's claim, 
there is historical evidence that Descartes' machine 
model of nonhumans encouraged vivisection (is it 
coincidental that Descartes himself engaged in the 
practice?).23 Later practitioners of vivisection who saw 
no need to use anesthesia, such as Claude Bernard, 
were clearly quite taken by the machine model and 
convinced they were not wronging their victims, just 
as the Port Royal Cartesians of Descartes' own century 
were. It is fascinating that Harrison uses the term 
cruelty in his discussion of the Port Royal horrors, 
and speaks of some Cartesians' advocacy of kindness 
to nonhuman animals. What sense can such terms, used 
by Harrison without quote marks this time, make? 
Could it be that Harrison cannot quite bring himself 
to believe his own view? 
Unlike Harrison, Carruthers straightforwardly draws 
the ethical implications of their shared position, finding 
it "morally objectionable" to be concerned about 
"nonexistent" cruelty on factory farms or in laboratories 
when conscious humans benefit from the products of 
such activities. Perhaps readers will recall that 
Carruthers declares it a "moral imperative" to stop 
feeling sympathy fornonhuman animals. lfnonhumans 
are unconscious, and we can benefit from trapping, 
vivisecting, and killing them, we ought to do exactly 
that, pausing only to educate the gullible public about 
the impossibility ofbeing "cruel" to nonhuman animals. 
In one sentence near the end of his original article, 
Harrison suggests that he is willing to consider adopting 
such a position: "Such causes as animal liberation may 
have to be rethought."24 
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On the contrary, such positions as Hanison's and 
Carruthers' should be rethought. In the absence of a 
strong case for the denial of nonhuman animal 
consciousness, we are obligated to take moral note of 
nonhuman animal suffering, as well as the suffering of 
humans who are too.young or too ill-equipped to rival 
Shakespeare. 
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